我国上市公司高管股权激励计划现状外文翻译

外文翻译

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2011 年 6 月

SOE Execs: Get Ready For Stock Incentives

TAN WEI

Stock option incentive plan will soon be available to state-owned enterprise executives, but will it lead to greater prosperity or new problems?

A trailblazing new scheme to infuse state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with incentive stock options is under way. It’s a plan that may bolster company performance, but it’s not without risks.

On August 15, Li Rongrong, Minister of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), disclosed that after careful study, a stock option incentive trial plan will be carried out in the listed SOEs.

According to the trial plan, about 102 A-share listed SOEs are expected to be the trial companies. The short list of some of those expecting to participate includes: China Unicom, Citic Group, Kweichow Moutai, China Merchants Bank and Beijing Financial Street Holding Co.

Stock option incentive plan is designed to entice executives to work hard for the long - term development of their companies. As stocks rise based on company performance, they too gain through this profits haring arrangement. This kind of incentive plan is popular in foreign countries, especially in the United States, where stock options can account for as high as 70 percent of a CEO’s income. Further, many economists believe the stock option incentive plan optimizes corporate governance structure, improve management efficiency and enhance corporate competitiveness.

On the other hand, after the Measure s on the Administration of Stock Incentive Plans of Listed Companies was issued early this ye a r, some of the companies turned out to have misused the incentive stock options. The result was insider dealings, performance manipulation as well as a manipulation of the company stock price. “Although the stock option incentive scheme is a frequently used tool to encourage top management, it could also be a double - edged sword especially in an immature market economy,” Li said. The SASAC is therefore taking a cautious approach, placing explicit requirements on corporate governance, the target and extent of the incentive measures, Li added.

Li stated that the overseas-listed SOEs would be the first few companies that will

implement the mechanism because of their sound management structure and law-abiding nature. Then the domestic listed SOEs will have the chance to embrace incentive stock options, which would be promoted if the trial results were good.

Executive face-lift

As for more than 900 listed SOEs, the personnel structure of the boards of directors will pro b ably face substantial change. That’s because the plan states that if the s t o ck option incentive mechanism is going to be implemented in listed SOEs, external directors should account for half of the board of directors.

The trial plan introduced the concept of external directors for the first time. The external director should be legally recommended by directors of listed SOEs, and should not be working in the listed SOEs or in a holding company, said the plan. However, currently, most of boards of directors of listed SOEs are not in compliance with the requirement. They have to readjust the structure of board of directors to fit in with the new mechanism.

“For most of the SOEs which are listed in the A-share market, their boards of directors are made up of non-external directors and independent directors, which means that apart from independent directors, members of board of directors are all working for the listed company or for the large shareholder,” said Zhu Yongmin, an economist with the Central University of Finance and Economics. “If the stock option incentive mechanism is to be carried out in those companies, a large-scale restructuring of board of directors is unavoidable and external directors must be introduced into the board.” China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) stipulates that an independent director is one who doesn’t hold another office beyond his job as a director, and has no such relations with major share holder that would interfere with the exercise of independent and objective judgment.

“Currently, the independent directors of listed companies can be categorized as external directors,” Zhu said. “However, the definition of external director is much broader than independent director. Those who work for a company which has business ties with a listed company, though they do not meet the requirements of being an independent director, but can be considered an external director.”

Additionally, the trial plan also stipulates that the salary committee of listed SOEs

that exercise the stock option incentive mechanism should be composed of external directors. However, for most of the listed companies, there are still non - external directors. As a result, a considerable number of listed SOEs need to transform their salary committee to fulfill the prerequisites of the stock option incentive mechanism.

Avoiding over-compensation

Over- compensation is something that the trial stock plan is trying to avoid as well. Therefore, the trial plan states that domestic listed SOEs’ executives should receive no more than 30 percent of their total salary (including options and dividends). But as for the overseas-listed SOEs, the maximum incentive is 40 percent of the target salary. The trial plan also fixes the volume of incentive stock options.

The trial plan states that the volume of incentive stock options should be fixed in accordance with the scale of the listed company and the number of incentive objectives. The number of share allocated may not exceed 10 percent of the company’s total share capital and no less than 0.1 percent.

In fact, Beijing Review was informed by the CSRC that some 20 listed SOEs also began exploring stock option incentive schemes in the first half of this year. But none of them received approval from the CSRC because their schemes revealed sharp contrast with the trial plan in terms of the scale of incentive stock options offered.

Results-oriented

Under the trial plan, better performance is a must to obtain stock privileges.

The number of incentive stock options that senior executives in listed SOEs can get depends on their annual performance. If they cannot fulfill the targeted objective s , the listed company may have the right to take back the incentive the stock options or purchase them back at the price at which they we re sold to the executives .

Zhu Yongmin noted that the stock option incentive plan is not invariable. The directors of listed companies, senior executives, and core technological and management personnel may not get the target stock options if they fail to achieve a satisfactory performance.

No freebies

For sure, state stocks won’t be given to executives for free, under the trial plan. “The state stocks have prices,” Zheng said. “If they we re paid to senior executives for free in the name of incentive stocks, it is equal to a loss of state assets. To elaborate, the incentive stocks should be the increment of stocks that are earned by the executives for listed SOEs after the implementation of the trial plan, and should not be previous stock inventory. In short, the past is past. Only future stock increases can be used as incentive stocks.”

Further, “The incentive stocks should not be paid only by the SASAC, which is the largest shareholder of all the central SOEs,” said Zheng Peimin, Chairman of Shanghai Realize Investment Consulting Co., who took part in drafting the trial plan,. “ The incentive plan should be a joint action of all share holders of a company and they should shoulder the same responsibility and enjoy equal benefit .”

Already, share holders pay for salaries of directors, senior executives and technology management staff.

“The incentive stocks should also be paid by all shareholders.” Zheng said. “For instance, if the government, or a state owned enterprise, holds 60 percent of a listed SOE, they should only pay 60 percent of the incentive stocks and 40 percent should be paid by other share holders.”

Investor pricing of CEO equity incentives

Jeff P. Boone Inder K. Khurana K. K. Raman

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to explore CEO compensation in the form of stock and options.The objective of CEO compensation is to better align CEO-shareholder interests by inducing CEOs to make more optimal (albeit risky) investment decisions. However, recent research suggests that these incentives have a significant down-side (i.e., they motivate executives to manipulate reported earnings and lower information quality). Given the conflict between the positive CEO-shareholder incentive alignment effect and the dysfunctional information quality effect, it is an open empirical question whether CEO equity incentives increase firm value. We examine whether CEO equity incentives are priced in the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium over the 1992–2007 time period. Our analysis controls for two potential structural changes over this time period. The first is the 1995 Delaware Supreme Court ruling which increased protection from takeovers (and decreased risk) for Delaware incorporated firms. The second is the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act which impacted corporate risk taking, equity incentives, and earnings management. Collectively, our findings suggest that CEO equity incentives, despite being associated with lower information quality, increase firm value through a cost of equity capital channel.

Keywords：CEO equity incentives，Information quality，Cost of equity capital

Introduction

In this study, we investigate investor pricing of CEO equity incentives for a large sample of US firms over the period 1992–2007.Because incentives embedded in CEO compensation contracts may be expected to influence policy choices at the firm level, our objective is to examine whether CEO equity incentives influence firm value through a cost of equity capital channel.

Prior research (e.g., Jensen et al. 2004; Jensen and Murphy 1990) suggests that equity- based compensation, i.e., CEO compensation in the form of stock and options, provides the CEO a powerful inducement to take actions to increase shareholder value (by investing in more risky but positive net present value projects). Put differently,

equity incentives are expected to help mitigate agency costs by aligning the interests of the CEO with those of the shareholders, and otherwise help communicate to investors the important idea that the firm’s objective is to maximize shareholder wealth (Hall and Murphy 2003).

However, recent research contends that equity incentives also have a perverse or dysfunctional downside. In particular, equity-based compensation makes managers more sensitive to the firm’s stock price, and increases their incentive to manipulate reported earnings—i.e., to create the appearance of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks (such as analysts’ forecasts)—in an attempt to bolster the stock price and their personal wealth invested in the firm’s stock and options (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006; Cheng and Warfield 2005). Stated in another way, CEO equity incentives can have an adverse effect on the quality of reported accounting information. As noted by Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and Jensen et al. (2004), by promoting perverse financial reporting incentives and lowering the quality of accounting information, equity-based compensation can be a source of, rather than a solution for, the agency problem.

Despite these arguments about the putative ill effects of equity incentives, equity-based compensation continues to be a salient component of the total pay packages for CEOs. Still, given the conflict between the positive incentive alignment effect and the dysfunctional effect of lower information quality, it is an open empirical question whether CEO equity incentives increase firm value. To our knowledge, prior research provides mixed evidence on this issue. For example, Mehran (1995) examines 1979–1980 compensation data and finds that equity-based compensation is positively related to the firm’s Tobin’s Q. By contrast, Aboody (1996) examines compensation data for a sample of firms for years 1980 through 1990, and finds a negative correlation between the value of outstanding options and the firm’s share price, suggesting that the dilution effect dominates the options’ incentive alignment effect. Moreover, both these studies are based on dated (i.e., pre-1991) data.

In our study, we examine whether CEO equity incentives are related to the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium, i.e., the excess of the firm’s ex ante cost of equity capital over the risk-free interest rate (a metric discussed by Dhaliwal et al. 2006).Consistent with Core and Guay (2002), we measure CEO equity incentives as the sensitivity of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio to a 1 percent change in the stock

price. Based on a sample of 16,502 firm-year observations over a 16 year period (1992–2007), we find CEO equity incentives to be negatively related to the firm’s ex ante equity risk premium, suggesting that the positive incentive alignment effect dominates the dysfunctional effect of lower information quality. In other analysis, we attempt to control for two regulatory (structural) changes that occurred during the 1992–2007 time period of our study.As pointed out by Daines (2001), regulatory changes can have an impact on firm values and returns as well as the structure of executive compensation. First, Low (2009) finds that following the 95 Delaware Supreme Court ruling that resulted in greater takeover protection, managers reduced firm risk by turning down risk-increasing (albeit positive NPV) projects. In response, firms increased CEO equity incentives to mitigate the risk aversion. Potentially, the impact of the Delaware ruling on managers’ risk aversion and the follow-up increase in equity incentives (to mitigate the increase in managers’ risk aversion following the ruling) may have resulted in a structural change in our sample at least for firms incorporated in Delaware. To control for this potential structural impact, we perform our analysis for Delaware incorporated firms for 1996–2007 separately. Our results suggest that the favorable effect of CEO equity incentives on firm value (as reflected in the lower ex ante equity risk premium) is similar for Delaware firms and other firms.

Second, a number of studies (e.g., Cohen et al. 2007, 2008; Li et al. 2008) indicate that the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) lowered equity incentives (i.e., reduced the proportion of equity incentives to total compensation post-SOX), reduced managerial risk taking, decreased spending on R&D and capital expenditures, and reduced accruals-based earnings management while increasing real earnings management. Since real earnings management is potentially more difficult for investors to detect than accruals-based earnings management, a possible consequence of SOX could be an increase in agency costs since 2002. To control for the potential structural changes imposed by SOX both in terms of expected returns and the level of equity incentives, we perform our analysis for the pre-SOX and post-SOX time periods separately. For each of the two time periods, our results suggest a favorable effect of CEO equity incentives on firm value (as reflected in the lower ex ante equity risk premium), although the effect appears to be stronger in the post-SOX period. Our study contributes to the literature on the valuation of equity incentives. We

provide (to our knowledge) first-time evidence on the relation between CEO equity incentives and the ex ante cost of equity capital. Prior research has focused by and large on the consequences of managerial equity incentives for firm performance (Mehran 1995; Hanlon et al.2003) and risk taking (Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002; Coles et al. 2006; Hanlon et al. 2004) rather than on valuation per se. As noted previously, to our knowledge only two prior studies (Aboody1996 and Mehran 1995, both based on pre-1991 data) have examined the pricing of managerial equity incentives, with mixed results.

In our study, we provide evidence on the valuation effects of CEO equity incentives based on more recent (1992–2007) data. By focusing on more recent data, our findings relate to a growing line of research on the association between equity-based compensation and accounting information quality. Specifically, Coffee (2004) suggests that the $1 million limit on the tax deductibility of cash compensation for senior executives imposed by Congress in 1993 motivated firms to make greater use of equity compensation which, in turn, increased the sensitivity of managers to the firm’s stock price. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Cheng and Warfield (2005) provide evidence which suggests that equity incentives are positively related to the magnitude of accruals-based earnings management. Similarly, Burns and Kedia (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007) report CEO equity incentives to be positively related to accounting irregularities and the subsequent restatement of previously issued financial statements. Thus, prior research suggests that equity-based compensation has a negative effect on the quality of earnings reported by firms. Consistent with several published empirical studies that support the notion that lower information quality is priced in a higher cost of equity capital (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005), CEO equity incentives could potentially lower firm value by increasing the firm-specific equity risk premium.

As noted previously, we document that CEO equity incentives (despite the associated lower information quality) are related negatively to the firm’s ex ante equity risk premium, implying that equity incentives increase firm value by lowering the firm’s cost of equity capital.Thus, our findings suggest that the positive CEO-shareholder incentive alignment effect associated with equity incentives dominates the dysfunctional information quality effect.

Since 1992, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has mandated the

public disclosure of executive compensation data to promote informed decision making by investors. Our findings provide further evidence that these disclosures increase the informativeness of stock prices in competitive securities markets. Collectively, given that CEO compensation is a topic of ongoing interest (Jensen et al. 2004; Reich 2007), our findings indicate that CEO equity incentives influence firm value favorably through a cost of equity capital channel.

Concluding remarks

Prior research (e.g., Goldman and Slezak 2006; Jensen et al. 2004) suggests that CEO equity incentives can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, these incentives can mitigate the agency problem by aligning the interests of the CEO with those of the shareholders (i.e., by inducing CEOs to prefer more optimal, albeit risky, investment choices). On the other hand, these incentives can lead to excessive sensitivity to share price performance and induce executives to manipulate reported earnings with an eye on the stock price. In other words, by promoting perverse reporting incentives and lowering the quality of accounting information pertinent to investor pricing decisions, CEO equity incentives can potentially be a part of, not a remedy for, the agency problem. However, to our knowledge there is little to no prior evidence to suggest which effect—the positive incentive alignment effect or the perverse information quality effect—dominates.

We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we show that CEO equity incentives are negatively related to the firm-specific equity risk premium, i.e., the positive incentive alignment effect associated with these incentives dominates the dysfunctional information quality effect in the pricing of the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium. Second, since equity incentives are intended to induce CEOs to make more optimal (albeit risky) investment decisions, the effect of these incentives on shareholder wealth in the post-SOX time period is of particular interest. Our results suggest that the economic significance of these incentives (i.e., the payoff for shareholders in terms of a lower ex ante equity risk premium and a higher firm value) was in fact higher in the post-SOX time period. Finally, our findings provide further evidence that the SEC mandated disclosures (since 1992) of executive compensation data increases the informativeness of stock prices with respect to the potential implications of CEO equity incentives for the cost of equity capital and firm value. At this time, CEO compensation is a topic of ongoing interest for regulators and investors

(Jensen et al. 2004; Reich 2007). Collectively, our findings complement and extend prior research on equity incentives. They are potentially useful in better informing regulators and investors faced with questions about the possible consequences of CEO equity incentives for shareholder wealth.

国有企业高管：准备迎接股权激励计划

谭卫

股票期权激励计划将很快应用于国有企业管理人员，但这会带来更大的繁荣，还是新的问题？

一个开创性的计划正被引入——国有企业正在实施股票期权激励计划，它可能会增强公司业绩，但它并非没有风险。

8月15日，国资委李蓉蓉透露，经过仔细研究，股票期权激励计划将要在上市国有企业试行。

根据计划，约有102家A股上市国有企业将要参与此计划，包括：中国联通，中信集团，贵州茅台，中国招商银行和北京金融街控股股份有限公司。

期权激励计划致力于吸引企业管理人员专注于他们公司的长远发展。由于股票价格是在公司业绩提高的基础上上升的，他们也通过此来做工作安排。这种激励计划在国外很受欢迎，特别是在美国，那里的股票期权可以占到首席执行官的收入的高达百分之七十之多。此外，许多经济学家认为，股票期权激励计划有助于优化公司治理结构，提高管理效率，增强公司的竞争力。

另一方面，在实施上市公司股权激励计划管理的初期，竟然发现一些公司误用激励股票期权。其结果导致内幕交易，恶意操纵该公司的股票价格。

“虽然股票期权激励计划是一个经常使用的工具，但是它亦可以被称为一把双刃剑，尤其是在一个不成熟的市场经济之下。”李蓉蓉说。因此，国资委采取谨慎的态度，对于实施股权激励计划的企业，在企业管治，目标和奖惩措施的范围等方面提出了明确的要求，李蓉蓉补充说。

李指出，因为海外上市的国有企业有可靠的管理和健全的法律机制，所以他们将是为数不多的几家将实现此股权激励机制的公司，这一现象也遵从了自然规律。其后，如果他们的试行被证明是有效地，在国内上市的国有企业将有机会实施期权激励。

整顿管理层

对于上市的900多个国有企业，董事局的人员结构可能将要面临实质的变化。这是因为该计划规定，如果上市公司预期实施期权激励机制，外部董事应当占上市国有企业董事会全部董事人数的一半。

在该次计划的试行中，首次引入了外部董事这一概念。该计划规定，外部董事应当由上市国有企业的董事通过合法程序推荐，而不应在上市国有企业或控股公司工作。但是目前，大多数上市国有企业的董事会并不符合规定。他们必须重新调整董事会结构，以适应新的机制要求。

“对于大多数在A股市场上市的国有企业，其董事会都是由非外部董事和董事组成，这意味着，除了董事，董事会成员都为上市公司工作，并且持股比例很大。” 财经大学的经济学家朱永敏说。 “如果股票期权激励机制在这些公司中实施，大规模改组董事会是不可避免的，外部董事必须加入其中。”

中国证券监督管理委员会（）规定，董事是指，不在上市公司担任除董事外的其他职务，并与其所受聘的上市公司及其主要股东不存在可能妨碍其进行客观判断关系的董事。

“目前，上市公司的董事可归类为外部董事，”朱永敏说，“然而，外部董事的定义比董事更广泛。有些董事为某其他公司工作，而且此公司与上市公司存在业务联系，虽然他们不符合作为一个董事的要求，但可视为外部董事。

此外，该试行计划还规定，在上市的国有企业中，运作股权激励机制的薪酬委员会应由外部董事组成。然而，对于大多数的上市公司而言，还没有外部董事。因此，有相当数量的上市国有企业需要改造其薪酬委员会，以满足履行股票期权激励机制的必要条件。

避免超额补偿

超额补偿在股权激励机制的试行阶段也应当避免发生。

因此，该试行计划指出，国内上市的国有企业管理人员应该接受的补偿不超过工资总额的百分之三十（包括期权和股息）。但对于海外上市的国有企业，最高奖励为目标底薪的百分之四十。

该试行计划还规定了股票期权激励数量。

该试行计划指出，股票期权激励数量应按照上市公司的规模和激励目标的数量而固定。分配股份的数量不得超过公司的总资本的百分之十，也不得低于百分之零点一。

事实上，北京周报从获悉，在上半年，大约有二十家上市国有企业也开始探索实施股票期权激励计划，但他们没有得到批准，因为他们在试行

计划中透露出的规模而言，与股票期权激励计划所提供的审讯形成强烈的对比

结果导向

试验计划下，更好的表现必然会获得更多的股票。在上市国有企业的高层管理人员能得到多少股票期权激励，取决于其年度业绩。如果他们不能完成预期目标，上市公司可能有权收回奖励或用之前公司卖给高管的股票期权的价格回购。

朱永敏指出，股票期权激励计划不是一成不变的。如果上市公司的董事会、高级管理人员、核心技术和管理人员不能达到令人满意的表现，则不得获取预期的股票期权。

无赠品

当然，在试行计划中，国有股将不会免费给予高管。

“国有股有价格，”郑培民说，“如果我们以激励股票的名义免费给予他们，那等同于国有资产流失。要精心策划，激励股票应该是在计划执行期结束后，管理人员为其上市国有企业赚取得股票增值，而不应是以前的存货。总之，过去的已经过去，只有未来股价上升，才可以被用来作为激励股票。”

“此外，虽然国资委是所有核心国有企业的最大股东，激励股票的支付也不应只由国资委支付。”郑培民说。上海实现投资咨询有限公司的总裁，它负责起草部分试行计划。“激励计划应该是一个企业的所有股份持有人的联合行动，他们应该承担同样的责任并享受平等的利益。”

目前，股份持有人支付董事，高级管理人员和技术管理人员的工资。 “激励股票也应该由全体股东一起支付。”郑培民说。“举例来说，如果或一个国家持有一家上市国有企业百分之六十的股份，他们应当只支付激励股份百分之六十，其余的百分之四十应当由其他股东支付。”

总裁股权激励的投资者定价

Jeff P. Boone Inder K. Khurana K. K. Raman

摘 要

本论文的主要目的是探讨首席执行官以股票和期权形式的报酬问题。首席执行官报酬调整的目的是通过优化调整首席执行官作为股东的利益，使首席执行官做出更多的投资决策（尽管有风险）。然而，最近的研究表明，这些激励措施有重大弊端（例如，他们鼓动高管操纵对外公开的业绩，降低会计信息质量）。鉴于积极的总裁股权激励效应和不良的信息质量效果之间的冲突，“CEO股权激励是否增加公司价值”便成了一个开放的实证问题的。我们看看，在1992年至2007年间，总裁股权激励是否在公司发生特定事前，其定价高于股票风险溢价。在这一时期，我们的分析控制在两个潜在的结构变化之中。首先是1995年美国特拉华州最高的裁决，它增加了在美国特拉华州注册成立的公司在收购方面的保护（降低风险）。第二个是2002年颁布的萨班斯-奥克斯利法案，它影响着企业风险的承担，股权激励和盈余管理。总的来说，我们的研究结果表明，总裁的股权激励尽管是低信息质量的，但是它通过调整股权资本成本，提高了公司的价值。

关键词：总裁股权激励，信息质量，股权资本成本

介 绍

在这项研究中，在这项研究中，我们通过调研美国企业在1992年至2007年期间的一个庞大的样本，调查了美国企业对总裁股权激励的投资者定价。因为首席执行官的薪酬激励是要嵌入到他们的薪酬补偿合同中的，因此预期可能影响在企业层面的选择。我们的目标是，审查总裁股权激励是否会通过股权资本成本这一渠道，从而影响公司价值。

以前的研究（例如，延森等人在2004年的研究;詹森和墨菲在1990年的研究）认为，基于股权的补偿，即以股票和期权的形式的总裁薪酬补偿，为首席执行官提供了强大的动力，诱导他们采取行动，提高股东利益（通过投资更多的风险大，但净现值高的项目这种方式）。换句话说，股权激励制度将有助于通过调整总裁与其他股东的利益，减少代理成本，除此之外，还有助于与投资者沟通，向他们阐述公司的目标是股东财富最大化这一重要理念（霍尔和墨菲在2003的研究）。

然而，最近的研究声称，股权激励也有倒行逆施的一面，或者说，也有不良的弊端。特别是，以股权激励为基础的薪酬补偿，使管理人员对该公司的股票价

格更敏感，并可能为了提高他们的收益而去操纵公布的业绩，例如创建名义会议或歪曲收益基准（如分析师的预测），企图提高股票价格，以及他们的个人财富——投资于该公司的股票和期权（博格斯和菲利在2006年的研究；伯恩斯和凯迪亚 2006年的研究，程沃菲尔德在2005年的研究）。换句话说，总裁股权激励可以对公开列报的会计信息的质量产生负面影响。正如别布丘克和弗瑞得（2003）和詹森等人（2004）所指出的那样，通过助长不正当的财务报告激励措施和降低会计信息的质量，以股权为基础的薪酬制度是产生代理问题的来源，而不是一种解决方案。

尽管存在由股权激励而推断出的这些不良影响，以股权为基础的薪酬制度仍然在总裁们的薪酬总额占重要份额。不过，考虑到积极的总裁股权激励效应和不良的会计信息质量效果之间的冲突，总裁股权激励制度是否能增加公司价值，成为一个开放的实证问题。据我们所知，以前的研究提供了有关该问题的不同方面的证据。例如，迈赫兰（1995）研究1979年至1980年的薪酬数据，并认为股权报酬与公司的托宾Q指数呈正相关。与此相反，阿布德（1996）研究了某公司从1980年到1990年有关薪酬的样本数据，并发现尚未行使购股权价值和公司的股价呈负相关。这表明稀释效应在股票期权激励效果中占主导地位。此外，这两个研究都基于以前（即1991年之前）的数据。

在我们的研究中，我们研究是否总裁股权激励与该公司特定的事前股权风险溢价，即该公司超额的事前无风险利率权益资本（达利瓦等人在2006年研究的一种度量）有关。与考尔和瓜伊（2002）一致，我们计算总裁股权激励在股票和期权的投资组合中，股票价格每变动百分之一的敏感性。以某公司观察期超过16年（1992-2007）的样本为基础，我们发现总裁股权激励与公司的事前股权风险溢价呈负相关，这由此表明了积极的股权激励效果主导了较低的信息质量这一不良影响。

在其他的分析中，我们试图控制为两个常规（结构方面）的变化，这些变化在我们1992年至2007年的研究期间发生过。正如戴恩斯（2001）指出的那样，结构变化可能对公司价值、回报，以及行政补偿的结构有影响。首先，劳尔（2009）发现，继1995年特拉华州最高的裁决造成了更大的收购保护以来，经理用拒绝高风险的投资项目（虽然净现值是正的）这种方式来降低公司的风险。相应的，公司增加总裁的股权激励，以减轻风险规避。也许，特拉华州最高的关于经理人风险规避的裁决而产生的影响，和后续股权激励的增加（目的是减轻经理人风险规避的可能性）可能导致我们研究的样本中的企业，至少在特拉华州的企业的结构变革。为了控制这种潜在的结构方面的影响，我们分别根据1996年

至2007年在美国特拉华州注册成立的公司做研究分析。我们的研究结果表明，总裁股权激励对公司价值（如在事前降低股权风险溢价时反映）产生的有利影响与特拉华州的公司以及其他公司相似。

其次，许多研究（例如，科恩等人在2007年和2008年的研究;李等人在2008年的研究）表明，2002年颁布的萨班斯-奥克斯利法案降低了股权激励（即降低了股权激励占报酬总额的比例），降低了管理风险承担，降低研发支出和资本支出，以及降低应计盈余管理，同时提高实际盈余管理。由于实际盈余管理对投资者来说可能比权责发生制基础下盈余管理更为困难，萨班斯法案的一个可能产生的后果就是自2002年以来，代理成本增加。为了控制由萨班斯法案带来的，无论在预期收益方面，还是股权激励水平方面表现出的潜在的结构变化，我们分别对萨班斯法案颁布前和颁布后的时间段做了分析。通过对这两个时间段的分析，我们的结果证明了，对的总裁股权激励制度对公司价值（如在事前降低股权风险溢价时反映）有积极的影响，但这积极作用似乎是在萨班斯法案颁布后发挥得更强。

我们的研究对于股权激励估值方面的著作有显著贡献。我们提供（据我们所知）最新的有关总裁股权激励和事前权益资本成本之间的关系的证据。先前的研究目前大多数都集中在股权激励管理对公司绩效产生后果方面（迈赫兰在1995年的研究；安隆等人在2003的研究）和风险承担方面（赖吉哥保和谢夫林在2002年的研究；科尔斯等人在2006年的研究；安隆等人在2004年的研究），而不是估值本身。如前所述，据我们所知，之前只有两个研究（埃布德在1996年的研究和迈赫兰在1995年的研究，都以1991年之前的数据为基础）探讨过股权激励管理的定价问题，其结果是喜忧参半。

在我们的研究中，我们提供关于总裁股权激励估值影响的证据，而他们更多以近期（1992-2007）数据为基础。通过集中审视这些近期数据，我们的发现涉及到一条不断攀升的，有关股权补偿和会计信息质量的关联线。具体来说，科菲（2004）表明，国会于1993年颁布了一项规定，即对高管一百美元的现金补偿局限于扣除的税额，以此来激励公司更有效的运用股权激励制度。反过来，这也增加了管理人员对公司股价的敏感性。 博格和菲利（2006）、程和沃菲尔德（2005）提供的证据表明，股权激励与权责发生制为基础的盈余管理呈正相关。同样，伯恩和凯迪亚（2006），以及爱芬迪等人（2007）的报告表明，总裁股权激励与会计违规和随后的重述财务报表呈正相关。因此，以前的研究表明，基于股权的补偿，对公司报告的盈余质量有负面影响。与一些已经发表的实证研究一致，也支持这一观点，即较低的信息质量是因为有一个较高的股权资本成本（例如，巴特

查亚等人在2003年的研究；弗朗西斯等人在2005年的研究），总裁股权激励有可能通过增加企业特有的股权风险溢价，降低公司价值。

如前所述，我们的研究中，总裁股权激励与公司的事前股权风险溢价呈负相关（尽管相关性低），这意味着股权激励通过降低公司的股权资本成本来抬高公司价值。因此，我们研究显示，积极的股权激励效果主导了较低的信息质量这一不良影响。

自1992年以来，美国证券交易委员会（SEC）已授权公开披露高管薪酬数据，以促进投资者做出明智的决定。我们的研究结果进一步证明，这些披露提高了在激烈竞争的证券市场下的股票价格的信息含量。总的来说，考虑到总裁薪酬是大众一直感兴趣的话题（詹森等人在2004年的研究；莱希等人在2007年的研究），我们的研究结果表明，通过股权资本成本这一渠道，总裁股权激励制度对公司价值起积极作用。

结 语

以前的研究（例如，高盛和斯里萨克在2006年的研究；詹森等人在2004的研究）认为，总裁股权激励是一把双刃剑。一方面，这些激励措施可以通过调整总裁与其他股东的利益的减少两者争端（即，通过激励总裁们做出更加优化、低风险的投资决策）。另一方面，这些激励措施可能导致高管对股价的过度敏感性，诱导高管操纵股票价格。换言之，通过奖励措施，激励了总裁优化决策，也降低了与投资者定价决策相关的会计信息质量，总裁股权激励有可能成为一部分，而不全是代理问题的补救措施。然而，据我们所知，事先并没有证据显示其效果，即积极的股权激励效果主导了较低的信息质量这一不良影响。

我们致力于以下几个方面的研究。首先，我们证明了总裁股权激励与公司的特定股权风险溢价呈负相关，即在特定的事前股权风险溢价，积极的股权激励效果主导了较低的信息质量这一不良影响。其次，由于股权激励的目的是促使总裁们做出更优的投资决策（虽然有风险），对股东股权激励制度在萨班斯法案颁布后一段时间对股东财富的影响特别受人关注。我们的研究结果证明了这些激励措施的经济意义（即股东在一个较低的事前股票风险溢价和较高的公司价值时的回报额，其实在萨班斯法案颁布后的时间内提高了）。最后，我们的发现进一步证明，美国证券交易委员会规定披露的高管薪酬数据（自1992年起）提高了关于权益资本成本的信息质量和企业价值，这些是总裁股权激励产生的潜在影响。如今，总裁薪酬是监管机构和投资者持续感兴趣的话题（詹森等人在2004年的研究；莱希在2007年的研究）。总的来说，我们的发现补充并扩展关于股权激励

的以前的研究。当有关监管机构和投资者存在针对总裁股权激励对股东财富造成的可能后果产生疑问时，我们的研究成果可能非常有用。